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WHOLE-FARM REVENUE INSURANCE FOR CROP AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCERS 
 
 
The collapse in hog prices in the fall of 
1998 has renewed interest in using insurance 
as a means of providing an affordable safety 
net to U.S. farmers.  One option that has 
received attention is to expand USDA’s crop 
insurance program to include livestock 
producers.  A coalition of U.S. senators, for 
example, has introduced legislation to 
amend the Federal Crop Insurance Act to 
allow livestock insurance.  And, President 
Clinton has called for livestock insurance as 
part of his FY 2000 budget submission to 
Congress. 
 
The ongoing financial crisis in the hog 
sector was not caused by production or 
disease problems.  Therefore it is apparent 
that what the senators and the president have 
in mind is either price insurance or revenue 
insurance.  The creation of a price or 
revenue insurance program raises a number 
of practical issues regarding what to insure, 
how to insure it, and how much the coverage 
should cost.  This briefing paper discusses 
some of the issues raised by an expansion of 
revenue insurance, and provides a “worked 
example” of a whole-farm insurance product 
that insures against revenue losses from a 
farm that raises corn, soybeans, and hogs. 
 
Livestock Risk 
All farm operations face two sources of 
risk that affect gross revenue: output price 
risk and production or yield risk.  In 
addition, livestock producers are exposed to 
significant risk arising from changes in the 
price of inputs such as feed.  Until 1996 the 
only form of insurance provided by the 
USDA was traditional crop insurance that 
protects farmers against yield losses.  The 
historical focus on yield insurance is 
understandable for at least three reasons.  
First, in most areas of the country, yield risk 
for the major crop commodities, including 
corn, soybeans, cotton, wheat, grain 
sorghum, and barley, is much greater than 
price risk.  Thus, yield insurance provides 
significant financial protection to many 
farmers.  Second, until the 1996 crop year, 
farmers were able to count on government 
commodity programs for price insurance.  
The size of subsidy payments (deficiency 
payments) were inversely related to crop 
price, so that low prices brought on higher 
payments.  And third, price insurance is 
provided by the private sector at commodity 
exchange markets such as the Chicago 
Board of Trade, The Kansas City Board of 
Trade, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 
and the Minneapolis Grain Exchange. 
 
The elimination of government 
deficiency payments coincided with the 
introduction of revenue insurance programs 
in 1996.  Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) 
and Income Protection (IP) became 
available in that year.  Revenue Assurance 
(RA) became available in 1997, and Group 
Risk Income Protection (GRIP) will be 
available in 1999.  None of these new 
revenue insurance products cover livestock 
revenue.  If livestock revenue were to be 
included into any of these revenue insurance 
products, how could it be done? The first 
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issue to be addressed is whether to cover 
both production risk and price risk or just 
price risk. 
 
Livestock production risk for most 
producers is significantly less than crop 
production risk.  This lower risk is due to 
livestock being more adaptable to variations 
in weather than crops, and because modern 
livestock operations attempt to insulate 
animals against stress caused by adverse 
weather conditions.  This is not to say, 
however, that production risk does not exist.  
Hog and poultry producers can unexpectedly 
lose significant numbers of animals from 
disease or mechanical failure in confinement 
operations.  Another source of production 
risk is variability in weight gain in grass-fed 
beef cattle operations.  Poor range 
conditions due to inadequate rainfall can 
lead to less than expected weight gain. 
 
Thus, for some livestock operations, 
production risk may be a significant source 
of overall risk.  But for most livestock 
producers production risk is relatively minor 
compared to price risk.  Figure 1 (see p. 3 of 
this report) illustrates the amount of price 
variability in the U.S. hog market.  Graphed 
is the percent deviation in the closing 
August live hog futures from the futures 
price quoted on March 1 from 1967 to 1997.  
As can be seen, it is difficult for a hog 
farmer to count on a certain price being 
available five or six months ahead. 
 
Also relevant to livestock producers is 
the variation in input costs.  With the run-up 
in corn and soybean prices that began in the 
fall of 1995, hog producers faced production 
costs that were much greater than 
anticipated.  These two types of risk (output 
prices and input costs) are the source of 
most of the income risk faced by hog 
producers.  Therefore, in this paper we 
model both input and output price risk for 
hog producers in a manner similar to the 
way yield and output prices are modeled 
under crop revenue insurance policies.  The 
livestock guarantee protects net revenue, 
i.e., output revenue less feed costs, while the 
crop revenue guarantee is for total revenue.  
This difference between net revenue for 
livestock and gross revenue for crops is not 
important because crop producers typically 
know what their input costs will be.  Thus a 
gross crop revenue guarantee essentially 
protects net crop revenue. 
 
A Whole-Farm Safety Net  
One term that occurs frequently in the 
debate about adding livestock revenue 
guarantees is the concept of a whole-farm 
safety net (or farm income safety net).  The 
implication of this phrase is that farmers 
care more about their end-of-year finances 
than about any of the components, (yield, 
output prices, or input costs) that contribute 
to this year-end position.  From an insurance 
perspective this concept also makes sense 
because fair insurance premiums of a whole-
farm policy may be far lower than the sum 
of insurance premiums on all of the 
components.  It is also possible to offer 
much higher coverage levels on whole-farm 
policies.  Higher coverage levels are 
possible not only because they are more 
affordable because of a lower risk, but also 
because the moral hazard problems that may 
occur when one component (such as yield) 
is insured are far less important when the 
policyholder has insured all enterprises on 
the farm. 
 
Figure 1. Percent Deviation in August Settlement Price 
from March Futures Price on Live Hog Contract
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The possibility of protecting entire farm 
revenue at a high but affordable coverage 
level creates the safety net that is so much in 
demand.  Thus, as a first step, this paper 
focuses on livestock net revenue insurance 
coupled with crop revenue insurance. 
 
Utilizing Existing Private Sector Financial 
Instruments 
It is currently possible for livestock 
producers to purchase a form of price 
insurance on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange.  This can take the form of a 
futures contract used to lock in a price or a 
put option that is used to create a price floor.  
Before anyone proposes the introduction of 
federally-subsidized competition to existing 
futures markets, they may be asked to show 
why such coverage would be more attractive 
to livestock producers, or show how the 
federal product could complement rather 
than substitute for existing speculative 
markets. 
 
Why might livestock price insurance be 
more attractive than futures and options 
markets? 
An easy answer to this question might 
be that very few livestock farmers use 
futures and that a federal subsidy might at 
least increase the number of those who do.  
However, there may be more compelling 
reasons.  First, the futures market offers a 
standardized product that attempts to be 
useful to a large number of individuals.  
Participation in these markets requires some 
specialized knowledge, access to liquid 
funds, and involves insuring relatively large 
amounts of product under one contract.  Put 
options are an expensive form of insurance 
because they pay out even in years in which 
whole-farm revenues are otherwise at a 
satisfactory level.  Futures contracts are 
risky because losses on the short futures 
position can be large when prices rise.  Also, 
there is no guarantee that the futures market 
position would exactly offset the price risk 
associated with hog production.  For 
example, a severe price drop might occur 
after one futures has expired and prices 
might rise before the next contract expires 
(as happened in December of 1998).  Also, 
prices in one location may not always be 
correlated with the cash prices used to settle 
futures contacts.  Finally, the livestock 
futures markets do not protect against 
increases in feed costs that can be as 
detrimental to producers as reductions in 
live hog prices. 
 
The insurance product we describe here 
could potentially eliminate some of these 
disadvantages.  First, the insurance contracts 
could be individualized to reflect the actual 
sales record of an individual producer.  This 
individualization could include the use of 
the weighted average sales price received by 
a particular producer over the course of a 
marketing year.  Also the terms and 
conditions used to define a contract would 
be those used in crop and life and casualty 
insurance and should not require any 
specialized knowledge or vocabulary.  
Third, they would be relatively inexpensive 
because they would insure against revenue 
losses on an entire farm operation over the 
course of a marketing year.  A loss caused in 
a hog operation in one month might be 
erased by profits made several months later, 
or by better than average crop yields or crop 
prices.  By insuring only against truly bad 
years, a whole-farm revenue contract will 
logically cost substantially less than separate 
insurance against declines in each of the 
components that contribute to whole-farm 
revenue. 
 
Whole-Farm Revenue Insurance  /  5
Would insurance complement or 
compete with existing futures and options 
markets? 
An important advantage of the types of 
insurance described here is that they could 
potentially increase liquidity on the futures 
and options markets.  If USDA rules 
allowed, insurance companies could lay off 
the systemic portion of the risk on the 
relevant futures or options market.  The 
insurer would retain only that portion of 
total risk that is poolable or non-systemic.  
For example, low prices in one area of the 
state might be offset by high prices in 
another area.  The insurer could use the 
premiums from the high price areas to pay 
indemnities in the low price areas.  If prices 
were low everywhere, then the insurance 
companies would receive a payout from the 
futures or option market and be in a position 
to pay all indemnities. 
 
The procedures by which insurance 
companies could sort out the poolable from 
the systemic risk are technically difficult.  
However, they have been successfully 
implemented and submitted to the USDA to 
gain approval for this concept.  To date such 
approval has not been granted although 
recent media stories suggest that the USDA 
may be considering a partial relaxation of 
reinsurance rules to allow the price risk 
associated with livestock insurance to be 
laid off on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange. 
 
Whole-Farm Revenue Insurance 
Incorporating Livestock 
As mentioned, the most straightforward 
way to incorporate livestock into a farm 
safety net would be to add the output price 
and input cost risk associated with livestock 
enterprises to an existing whole-farm crop or 
revenue insurance policy.  To date the only 
commercially available whole-farm, crop 
revenue policy is an option under Revenue 
Assurance.  This crop revenue insurance 
product is owned by the American Farm 
Bureau Insurance Services, Inc., and is now 
being sold in six states in the upper 
Midwest.  The procedures used to obtain the 
actuarially fair premium rates for the 
product described below are very similar to 
those used to rate Revenue Assurance.  The 
procedures are discussed in Hennessy, 
Babcock, and Hayes.1 
 
Before an example can be worked out, 
some differences between crops and 
livestock must be accounted for.  Crop 
farmers generally harvest their crops once 
per year at a predictable time.  Thus the 
price used to value harvest is the price that 
occurs at harvest time.  For example, for 
Crop Revenue Coverage and Revenue 
Assurance, the price used to value harvested 
corn is the average November quote of the 
December futures contract on the Chicago 
Board of Trade.  With livestock, however, 
“harvest” can occur many times during the 
year.  A livestock revenue insurance policy 
should be flexible enough to match the 
harvest price with livestock delivery. 
 
For hog producers, the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange has seven futures 
contracts in a given year: February, April, 
June, July, August, October, and December.  
Typically, farmers have a good idea about 
both the timing of deliveries and the 
quantity that will be delivered each year.  A 
sensible way of determining an expected 
hog price to use is to construct a weighted-
average settlement price, with weights given 
by the number of hogs to be marketed in 
each contract month.  For example, suppose 
a farmer plans on delivering 100 hogs in 
April, June, and August and 200 hogs in 
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October and December, and the current 
prices (adjusted to a per 100 pounds live-
weight basis) on these contracts are $50, 
$50, $40, $45, and $45 respectively.  Then 
the expected live hog price per hundred 
pounds used to value the average hog 
produced that year would equal $45.71. 
 
We would then need to adjust this 
expected live hog price for an expected feed 
cost.  In the example reported below we use 
the corn and soybean futures markets to 
calculate an expected total ration cost for 
each hog.  For example if the December 
corn contract was trading at $2.50 and the 
November soybean futures was at $5.50, 
then our expected ration cost would equal 
$0.176 per pound of live animal.  The 
producer would then have expected net 
revenue of $28.11 per 100 pounds.  Actual 
futures market settlement prices would later 
be used to calculate the actual net revenue 
using the same methods2.  A component of 
the whole-farm revenue guarantee would 
then be the difference between actual and 
actual net livestock revenues. 
 
One issue arises from the timing of the 
revenue guarantee.  For spring-planted crops 
in the Midwest, March 15 is the sales 
closing date for crop insurance policies.  
Correspondingly, CRC and RA use the 
average February quote of the December 
futures contract for corn as the price used to 
set revenue guarantees for corn.  In this 
example, we will maintain a March 15 sales 
closing date, and use the average of the first 
five trading days in March as the projected 
price for each of the live hog futures 
contract. 
 
The way that this example contract is set 
up, the farmer has until March 15 to 
determine the number of hogs that will be 
guaranteed under each futures market 
contract.  This will subsequently determine 
the whole-farm revenue guarantee.  Thus the 
amount of market revenue from hogs that 
will be added to harvest revenue from crops 
to determine whole-farm revenue can only 
be determined upon settlement of the last 
futures market.  Waiting for the last futures 
contract to close may delay calculation of 
whole-farm revenue because crop revenue 
from corn is known on December 1.  Thus, 
payment of indemnities will have to wait if 
the farmer plans on delivering hogs under 
the December or February contract. 
 
Fair Premiums for a Representative 
Corn-Soybean-Hog Farm 
To show the effects of adding hogs to a 
corn-soybean whole-farm insurance 
contract, we look at a 500-acre farm in 
Webster County, Iowa.  This farm has 250 
acres each of corn and soybeans.  Projected 
local prices of corn and soybeans in the fall 
are $2.10 and $5.00 respectively.  The 
approved yields for corn and soybeans are 
135 bu/ac and 40 bu/ac respectively.  The 
way we determine how much coverage 
should cost is to calculate how much an 
insurance company would lose on average if 
it sold this producer this policy for 5,000 
years.  The procedures we use to rate this 
whole-farm policy are very similar to those 
used to rate Revenue Assurance. 
 
Figure 2 (see p. 7 of this report) shows 
how introduction of hogs affects the 
actuarially fair whole-farm premium for this 
farm.3 When no hogs are marketed, the fair 
premium depends only on the percent of 
expected crop revenue insured.  Expected 
revenue from crops is springtime price times 
expected yield times acres for each crop, or 
$123,500 for the 500 acres.  At 90 percent 
coverage, the whole-farm revenue guarantee
Figure 2. Effect of Increasing Hog Marketings on 
Whole-Farm Revenue Insurance Premium
 (500 acres of corn/soybean land)
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 is $111,150 and the fair premium is $7,936.  
At 85 percent coverage, the fair premium is 
$6,004.  At 80 percent and 75 percent 
coverage levels the fair premiums are 
$4,479 and $3,020 respectively.4 For a 500-
acre crop farmer, a 90 percent premium of 
almost $8,000 is probably not affordable.  
Also, such a high coverage level may cause 
concerns among insurance companies and 
the federal re-insurers because of the 
potential for moral hazard. 
 
When we add 2,000 hogs to the mix, 
however, the whole-farm fair premium 
actually declines (see Figure 2).  This 
decline occurs even though hogs greatly 
increase the level of the revenue guarantee.  
In this example, the amount of revenue 
insured increases by $62.25 for each hog 
with 90 percent coverage, $59.73 per hog 
for 85 percent coverage, and $56.22 per hog 
for 80 percent coverage. 
 
The reason why the fair insurance 
premium decreases as the amount of 
insurance increases is that a corn-soybean-
hog farmer is much more diversified than a 
corn-soybean farmer.  Greater diver-
sification means lower risk.  That the total 
premium initially decreases as the amount of 
insurance increases means that the premium 
rate (dollars of premium per dollar of 
liability) must decrease dramatically as hogs 
are added to a whole-farm insurance 
contract. 
 
Figure 3 (see p. 9 of this report) shows 
how the introduction of hogs influences the 
insurance rate.  This is the cost (in cents) to 
this producer for each dollar of coverage.  
This figure shows that the decline is initially 
quite dramatic at all coverage levels.  The 
decline slows down as the percent of 
liability from livestock increases, flattening 
out as percent liability becomes greater than 
50 percent.  The effect of adding hogs to the 
policy is dramatic.  In most cases the rate 
falls by more than 60 percent as the farmer 
diversifies into hogs.  This low rate makes 
the higher coverage levels very affordable.  
Also the presence of hogs in the policy 
makes it much more difficult for the 
producer to cheat, thereby making these 
higher coverage levels more acceptable to 
the insurance industry. 
 
There are two reasons why the premium 
rate declines.  The first is that hog prices are 
largely uncorrelated with corn and soybean 
prices.  Adding hogs to corn and soybeans 
means that when corn and soybean revenue 
is low, there is a 50 percent chance that hog 
revenue will be greater than expected.  Thus, 
adding hogs significantly lowers the 
probability that an indemnity will be paid on 
corn and soybeans.  The second reason why 
the premium rate continues to decline even 
after full (50 percent) diversification is 
achieved is that net revenue from hogs is 
less variable than corn and soybean revenue.  
Thus the hog revenue added to corn and 
soybeans is not as risky as crop revenue 
alone, so the premium rate continues to 
decline as the farmer specializes in the less 
risky enterprise (hogs). 
 
Referring back to Figure 2, notice that 
the slowdown in the decline in premium 
rates means that total premium must 
eventually rise as more hogs are marketed.  
As shown, the turning point depends on the 
coverage level.  When 3,850 hogs are 
marketed at the 90 percent coverage level, 
the whole-farm premium with hogs equals 
the whole-farm premium without hogs.  This 
means that a farmer that markets 3,850 hogs 
pays the same insurance premium as a 
farmer who markets no hogs.  The 
Figure 3. Effect of Crop/Livestock Diversification on 
Whole-Farm Revenue Insurance Premium Rate
 (500 acres of corn/soybean land)
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difference is that the farmer who markets 
3,850 hogs has $239,663 more insurance 
coverage than the farmer who markets no 
hogs. 
The break-even number of hogs at 85 
percent coverage is 8,800 hogs.  At 80 
percent coverage, the break-even number of 
hogs is approximately 19,000.  As shown, 
the power of diversification means that a 
farmer can have a lower insurance premium 
even though the amount of insurance 
increases.  As mentioned, a common 
response to this type of diversification is to 
increase coverage level.  For example, if this 
farmer were to include 5,500 hogs in a 
whole-farm revenue insurance policy, the 
total fair premium at 85 percent coverage is 
approximately equal to the total premium at 
80 percent coverage for a crop-only whole-
farm policy.  The fair premium is the same, 
but the whole-farm revenue guarantee 
increases by $328,500, from $96,700 to 
$431,279. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The U.S. agricultural insurance 
program has evolved from insuring only 
individual crop yields to insuring the 
combined revenues from several crops.  The 
next phase in this evolution may involve the 
addition of livestock.  Here, we argue that 
the most effective way to insure livestock is 
to insure expected annual production against 
output price risk and input cost risk.  We 
also argue that it would be technically 
feasible to add this livestock net revenue 
guarantee to existing whole-farm crop 
revenue guarantees.  These policies could 
complement existing financial instruments 
offered on the Chicago mercantile exchange 
and the Chicago Board of Trade. 
In some preliminary sample rates 
presented here we show that the addition of 
livestock to whole-farm revenue guarantees 
can dramatically reduce both insurance rates 
and insurance premiums.  These lower rates 
make 90 percent coverage affordable and 
economically justified.  The availability of a 
90 percent revenue guarantee would create a 
farm income safety net for large numbers of 
diversified family farms. 
  
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. Hennessy, D., B.A. Babcock, and D. Hayes.  “The Budgetary and Producer Welfare Effects of Revenue 
Asssurance.”  American Journal of Agricultural Economics 79(August 1997):1024-34. 
 
2. Note that this expected net revenue does not include other variable input costs such as labor and veterinary 
costs, nor does it include overhead costs such as depreciation and loan financing.  We have ignored these costs 
because they are somewhat predictable and because they would greatly complicate any written insurance 
contract.  In addition, because feed costs also vary throughout the year, it may be better to construct season-
average feed price indices to correspond to season-average hog prices. 
 
3. An actuarially fair premium is set so that over the long haul premiums collected equal indemnities paid.  It does 
not include expense or underwriting loads typically applied by insurance companies and it does not include 
premium subsidies available under USDA crop insurance programs. 
 
4. The representative premiums calculated here do not correspond to actual whole-farm premiums available 
through Revenue Assurance because of different rating assumptions.  For comparison purposes, at the 
maximum available coverage level of 80 percent, the whole-farm Revenue Assurance fair premium for this 
farm is $4,440 at Chicago Board of Trade prices of $2.35 and $5.25 for corn and soybeans.  The fair premium at 
75 percent coverage is $3,020 at these prices. 
